Simon Adams, Executive Director des Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in New York

Interview mit Simon Adams: „mass atrocities are a developmental catastrophe“

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Simon Adams, Executive Director des Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in New York

Simon Adams, Executive Director des Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in New York

Simon Adams ist the Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in New York. He has worked extensively with civil society organizations around the world. He has published several books on international conflict and is a reknown expert on issues of mass atrocity prevention and international justice. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is working for the promotion of universal acceptance and effective operational implementation of the norm of the „Responsibility to Protect“ populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It engages in advocacy around specific crises, conducts research designed to further understanding of R2P, recommends strategies to help states build capacity, and works closely with NGOs, governments and international and regional institutions to operationalize the Responsibility to Protect. The Centre is funded by different governments, donations and individuals.

Genocide Alert has asked Simon Adams about his thoughts and recommendations on the nexus of conflict prevention, development cooperation and atrocity prevention.

Is there a difference between “conventional” development cooperation and structural mass atrocity prevention? If there is a difference, what is it? 

Simon Adams: There is obviously an overlap but I think what is distinct is where you apply a mass atrocity prevention lens to particular forms of development cooperation. Not to be too reductive, but is digging a well just an issue of providing clean drinking water in keeping with a particular SDG? What if the well is in a village where people are divided on the basis of rival communal identities and access to water is a source of conflict? What risks are therefore associated with digging the well? Could it actually end up exacerbating tensions or reinforcing discriminatory structures? Or could a well be provided in a way that actually helps bring the community closer together and helps overcome some past sources of conflict? I actually experienced this exact situation in East Timor in 2002 but it is illustrative of a bigger issue about how we understand that development cooperation does not take place in a political, historical and social void. Context is crucial.  

In Germany, the concept of mass atrocity prevention lies in the hands of the Foreign Office foremostly. Would it make sense to include mass atrocity prevention as an explicit goal of development cooperation? 

Simon Adams: Yes. Absolutely. We know, for example, that mass atrocities are a developmental catastrophe. The war in Syria has wiped out 35 years of developmental gains in health and welfare. The genocide in Rwanda caused a 60% reduction in the economy in one year. The civil war in Syria has kept an entire generation of kids out of school and will have a drastic impact on their ability to meet SDG goals. Mass atrocity prevention should definitely be an explicit goal of development cooperation. It’s not just a matter of avoiding risks, but of consciously understanding how development can help undermine the underlying sources of identity-based conflict.  

In its guidelines on crises prevention, the German Government declared that the prevention of genocide and other grave human rights violations belongs to the German reason of state. These guidelines explicitely are of cross-ministerial nature. What can a cross-ministerial coopearation in mass atrocity prevention look like in Germany or other states?  

Simon Adams: I think Denmark has made some progress in this area and some other states too. Cross-ministerial cooperation is essential. For example, I’m sure Germany’s ministries of justice, foreign affairs and development are all concerned about the situation with the Rohingya in Myanmar. It would be a disaster if future development cooperation in Rakhine State profited the people who carried out the genocide and whom the ministries of justice and foreign affairs probably think should be sanctioned or taken to the ICC.  

Do you know of any concrete cases where development cooperation might have hightened the risk of mass atrocities, for example by increasing tensions between different groups? 

Simon Adams: See my example re: East Timor above. Also, Rwanda was a major recipient of aid prior to the genocide. No one really questioned the fact that the regime openly discriminated against Tutsi. The government was also seen as a reliable and reasonably non-corrupt partner. Many western governments liked doing development work in Rwanda. And then of course 1994 happened. I think there are numerous other examples where governments who are recipients of aid divert that aid to benefit particular communities to the detriment of others.  

Do you know of any concrete cases where it is plausible to assume that development cooperation prevented onsets of mass atrocities? 

Simon Adams: Too many too list. Look at any country with identity-based divisions and with a history of violent conflict. I think development assistance has been crucial in many of these countries and not just those that have formally transitioned from active armed conflict to peace.  

What role can civil-society actors play in coordinating development cooperation and prevention of mass atrocities? 

Simon Adams: They are often not just the eyes and ears on the ground, but the mouth that can speak up about the specific ways in which particular forms of development cooperation could make a situation worse, or could radically improve it. 

 

The interview was conducted by Paul Stewens

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Dr. Daniel Dückers, Associate Research Fellow am GIGA Institut für Afrika-Studien

Interview mit Daniel Dückers: Bei Entwicklungszusammenarbeit wie sie auf Proklamationsebene gang und gäbe ist, „ist die strukturelle Prävention von Massenverbrechen im Konzept eingewoben“

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Dr. Daniel Dückers, Associate Research Fellow am GIGA Institut für Afrika-Studien

Dr. Daniel Dückers, Associate Research Fellow am GIGA Institut für Afrika-Studien

Dr. Daniel Dückers ist Associate Research Fellow am GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, einem Leibniz-Forschungsinstitut mit Sitz in Hamburg. Daniel Dückers Forschungsthemen umfassen unter anderemKonfliktanalyse, Zivile Krisenprävention, Entwicklungstheoretische Grundlagenforschung sowie Strategien zur Förderung nachhaltiger und egalitärer Gesellschaften. Er leitet leitet das Projekt „BMZ-Eskalationspotenzialanalyse“ (ehemals „Krisenfrühwarnung für das BMZ“). Jüngere Publikationen von Daniel Dückers sind Die Agenda 2030: Weniger als das Nötigste (GIGA Focus Global, 03/2017, Hamburg: GIGA) sowie Nachhaltiges Wohlbefinden. Das beanspruchte Entwicklungsverständnis der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft und dessen Messung anhand des Basic Development Index (BDI) (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2016).

Genocide Alert hat Daniel Dückers zu seiner Sicht auf die Sinnhaftigkeit einer separten Betonung der Prävention von Massenverbrechen in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit befragt.

Gibt es einen Unterschied zwischen “klassischer” Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und der strukturellen Prävention von Massenverbrechen? Wenn es einen Unterschied gibt, worin liegt er? 

Daniel Dückers: Was ist „klassische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit“ (EZ)? Wenn darunter „ganz klassisch“ Versuche der reinen Wirtschaftswachstumsstimulation verstanden werden, sind die Unterschiede sicherlich immens. Wird hingegen an eine EZ gedacht, wie sie schon seit vielen Jahren zumindest auf Proklamationsebene gang und gäbe ist, bei der es sich auch um ein Instrument zur Förderung nachhaltiger Menschenrechtsverwirklichung (bürgerliche, politische, wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Rechte und Freiheiten) und zur nachhaltigen Krisenprävention handelt, ist die strukturelle Prävention von Massenverbrechen im Konzept eingewoben – im Konzept, nicht notwendigerweise auf Implementierungsebene. Bei der Implementierung versprechen zahlreiche Strategien und Maßnahmen zumindest einigen Erfolg (Förderung gewaltfreier und fairer Konfliktregelungsmechanismen, Einhegung von Eskalations- und Gewaltpotenzialen, gesellschaftliche Verankerung von menschenrechtsbezogenen Werten, insbesondere Respekt und Toleranz), wobei externe Einflussmöglichkeiten, selbst unter vorbildlich partizipativen Bedingungen und großem Ownership, nicht überschätzt werden sollten 

In Deutschland liegt die Thematik der Prävention von Massenverbrechen maßgeblich beim Auswärtigen Amt. Wäre es sinnvoll, die Prävention von Massenverbrechen als explizite Zielsetzung in die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu integrieren? 

Daniel Dückers: Aus den aktuellen proklamierten Zielen des BMZ ergibt sich eine überaus große Aufgabenpalette, wie schon allein „das“ Ziel der vollständigen Menschenrechtsverwirklichung im Sinne der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte zeigt. Gerade in diesem Ziel ist zudem die Prävention von Massenverbrechen bereits enthalten, gleiches gilt, und hier noch unmittelbarer, für das Ziel der Krisenprävention, dem sich die offizielle deutsche EZ ja ebenfalls explizit verschrieben hat. Die Sinnhaftigkeit einer Ergänzung der Zielebene um eine nochmalige Betonung, zur Verhinderung von Massenverbrechen beitragen zu wollen, scheint daher eher zweifelhaft. 

Das Interview wurde von Paul Stewens geführt.

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Alexander BellamyAlexander Bellamy

Interview mit Alex Bellamy: „Structural atrocity prevention is about reducing atrocity risks and building resilience“

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Alexander Bellamy

Alexander Bellamy

Alexander Bellamy is Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at The University of Queensland, Australia. He is an expert on Human protection, Peacekeeping, and the Responsibility to Protect. His research research and policy consultancy focusses on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities and human security in the Asia Pacific region. The Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is engaing with partners across the Asia Pacific-region to protect vulnerable populations and to develop regional expertise on atrocity prevention. The Centre is funded by The University of Queensland and the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Genocide Alert has asked Alex Bellamy about his thoughts and recommendations on the nexus of conflict prevention, development cooperation and atrocity prevention.

Is there a difference between “conventional” development cooperation and structural mass atrocity prevention? If there is a difference, what is it? 

Alexander Bellamy: The goals are different. Development is focused on achieving economic growth and reducing poverty; structural atrocity prevention is about reducing atrocity risks and building resilience to those risks. Unless development planners are asking specific questions about how their work can support atrocity risk reduction and resilience building there is a good chance the work won’t get done. There is also a chance that development work can exacerbate risks (as happened in Sri Lanka for example) by unintentionally reinforcing other social divides.  

In Germany, the concept of mass atrocity prevention lies in the hands of the Foreign Office foremostly. Would it make sense to include mass atrocity prevention as an explicit goal of development cooperation? 

Alexander Bellamy: I usually talk about the injection of an ‘atrocity prevention lens’ into development cooperation. This need not require an explicit atrocity prevention in development cooperation – though it would always be useful to have one. Ideally, supporting atrocity prevention would be a whole of government aspiration driven by a government’s commitment to R2P. The point of a lens is to ensure that it is someone’s job to (1) assess risks/resilience in country and sensitize foreign office/development officials to those risks /sources of resilience; (2) examine whether partnerships are contributing to risk reduction/resilience building, and how they might better achieve this; (3) ensure that partnerships do no inadvertently increase risks.  

In its guidelines on crises prevention, the German Government declared that the prevention of genocide and other grave human rights violations belongs to the German reason of state. These guidelines explicitely are of cross-ministerial nature. What can a cross-ministerial coopearation in mass atrocity prevention look like in Germany or other states?  

Alexander Bellamy: every government is different in terms of how it organises itself and develops cross-ministerial policy. The US established an ‘atrocity prevention board’ comprising officials from relevant departments to share information and analysis. Others simply give their R2P focal point responsibility for coordinating across ministries. Others set up committees. The German government’s commitment goes beyond that of most other governments and creates a strong mandate for establishing some sort of whole of government mechanism. Whether that’s an individual, committee, or board, depends on what people think is the most effective way to get the job done. 

Do you know of any concrete cases where development cooperation might have hightened the risk of mass atrocities, for example by increasing tensions between different groups? 

Alexander Bellamy: Yes, Sri Lanka prior to 2009 – aid projects in Tamil run areas exacerbated tensions with local Sinhalese and created fears of an internationally backed pseudo state emerging. Another is Myanmar – the inflow of investment and aid in the context of government reform created impetus for land reclamations to allow inward investment. Demand for land in Rakhine state was one of the factors driving ‘clearance’ operations. It has also exacerbated Tatmadaw interest in securing access to timber and other resources in other conflict affected areas. In this context, it was significant that aid and investment did not come with strong human rights conditionality attached to it. 

Do you know of any concrete cases where it is plausible to assume that development cooperation prevented onsets of mass atrocities? 

Alexander Bellamy: When you’re talking structural risks, there is no direct connection between risk and the onset of atrocities. Societies with high risk can survive decades without ever succumbing to atrocities, for example. So we cannot  draw a direct line from structural prevention to avoidance. We can, however, look at places where risk has declined – such as Indonesia, Timor Leste, China itself – examples of countries that have experienced risk but not atrocities, such as Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia – and also examples of countries emerging from atrocities such as Sierra Leone and Liberia – this connection between peacebuilding and atrocity prevention is an important and understudied area.  

What role can civil-society actors play in coordinating development cooperation and prevention of mass atrocities? 

Alexander Bellamy: of course their role is limited when it comes to government led cooperation, but civil society actors can play a significant role in preventing atrocities. We know for example that where countries have vibrant civil societies they are much better placed to manage moments of tension and address underlying challenges. For example, Syria collapsed in part because there was no effective civil society. Meanwhile civil society in Kenya played a crucial role in preventing election violence in 2013. The key is to understand which civil society actors are playing positive roles in-country and to work with them to see what support can be offered. This can be done directly between civil society actors. For example, we are supporting local NGOs in Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Bangladesh to do things like community based early warning, counter hate speech, provide women and girls with stronger access to justice etc. There is much more that could be done in this space. 

 

The interview was conducted by Paul Stewens

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Workshop der Abteilung für Zivilangelegenheiten der UN-Operation in Côte d'Ivoire mit lokalen Führern in Bonoua 2012 (Quelle: UN PHOTO | # 511356)Workshop der Abteilung für Zivilangelegenheiten der UN-Operation in Côte d'Ivoire mit lokalen Führern in Bonoua 2012 (Quelle: UN PHOTO | # 511356)

Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und strukturelle Prävention von Massenverbrechen – ein Debattenprojekt

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In Deutschland hat das Prinzip der Schutzverantwortung immer wieder öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen, insbesondere durch die humanitäre Intervention von Frankreich, Großbritannien, den USA und ihren Verbündeten in Libyen im Jahr 2011. Viel zu oft steht jedoch die Frage der internationalen Reaktion auf Massenverbrechen mit Hilfe militärischer Gewalt im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion. Die frühzeitige Prävention von Völkermord, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und anderer schwerer Gräueltaten durch proaktives, ziviles Handeln, die im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion stehen sollten, wird dagegen oft vernachlässigt.

Die Prävention der schwerwiegendsten Gräueltaten darf sich nicht nur auf bewaffnete Konflikte konzentrieren. Um Gräueltaten vorzubeugen, ist es wichtig, zugrundeliegende Konfliktursachen anzugehen. In diesem Zusammenhang spielt die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zur Stärkung der lokalen Widerstandsfähigkeit und der niedrigschwelligen Präventionskapazitäten eine zentrale Rolle.

Über alle Politikfelder hinweg gilt es eine sogennante atrocity prevention lens einzurichten, gewissermaßen einen Filter, der über die bisher etablierten diplomatischen, entwicklungsunterstützenden, humanitären und auch militärischen Instrumente der Konfliktprävention und -bearbeitung gelegt wird, um Risiken und Anzeichen für mögliche Massenverbrechen bereits bei der politischen Planung zu berücksichtigen.

Debatte anstoßen, wie mit Instrumenten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zur strukturellen Prävention von Massenverbrechen beigetragen werden kann

In Deutschland wird jedoch meist nur auf das Auswärtige Amt verwiesen, wenn die Prävention von Massenverbrechen Thema ist. Die internationale Debatte über die Prävention von Gräueltaten wird in Deutschland kaum rezipiert. Dies liegt unter anderem daran, diese internationale Debatte eng mit dem Prinzip der Schutzverantwortung verbunden ist, dem viele aufgrund der Nähe zur Debatte über humanitäre militärische Interventionen skeptisch gegenüberstehen. Eine Debatte über zivile Möglichkeiten zur Prävention von Massenverbrechen ist aber dringend notwendig. Nicht zuletzt auch, um die Erklärung der Bundesregierung in ihren Leitlinien zur Krisenprävention, dass die Prävention von Völkermord und schwersten Menschenrechtsverletzungen Teil der deutschen Staatsräson sei, Wirklichkeit werden zu lassen.

Wie kann mit Instrumenten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zur strukturellen Prävention von Massenverbrechen beigetragen werden? Wir haben Expertinnen und Experten in diesem Bereich befragt, um mehr darüber zu erfahren, wie Prävention von Gräueltaten in Programmen der Ent­wicklungs­­zusammen­arbeit gestärkt werden kann. Die Interviews wurden 2019 geführt und werden in den kommenden Wochen in loser Reihenfolge auf unserer Website veröffentlicht.

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